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PSA (probabilistic safety assessment) software, the indispensable tool in nuclear safety assessment, has
been widely used. An integrated reliability and PSA program named RiskA has been developed by FDS
Team. RiskA supplies several standard PSA modules including fault tree analysis, event tree analysis,
uncertainty analysis, failure mode and effect analysis and reliability database, etc. RiskA has several
advanced features such as extensible framework, fast fault tree analysis, multiple models formats support
and web-based co-modeling. Not only the overview of the architecture and basic functions of RiskA, but
also the challenges and solutions in the development procedure of RiskA were introduced. The compar-
ison between RiskA and other popular PSA codes has demonstrated that the calculation and analysis of
RiskA is more accurate and efﬁcient. Based on the development of this code package, many applications
of safety and reliability analysis of some research reactors and nuclear power plants were performed.
 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Nuclear safety is signiﬁcant in nuclear industry. In history, there
were three severe nuclear accidents which are Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, attracting much attention
from scientists, engineers and the public. An efﬁcient safety
analysis method could help to improve the safety of a Nuclear
Power Plant (NPP). Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) (Keller
and Modarres, 2005) is one of the most useful methods for nuclear
safety analysis. PSA software, the indispensable tool in PSA, has
been widely used for the safety analysis of nuclear power plants
and other complex systems of aerospace, ship industry, defense,
etc. Up to now, there have been several quite popular PSA software,
such as CAFTA and RiskSpectrum which are widely used in nuclear
power plants, and Fault Tree+ and PTC Windchill FTA which are
widely used in reliability ﬁeld.
Several difﬁculties must be overcome for the further develop-
ment of PSA software. Real-time calculation is needed in the
on-line risk monitor, and co-modeling and automatic modeling
are necessary when the PSA model is too large to be constructed
by one person. In some cases, the functions of processing more
complex dynamic models and multi-state models should also be
supplied.To provide an independent PSA software for China and to deal
with some of the difﬁculties mentioned above, in collaboration
with several universities and institutes, FDS Team studied various
key algorithms and practical issues for the development of PSA
software, and has developed an integrated reliability and
probabilistic safety assessment program named RiskA (Wu et al.,
2007). RiskA could be applied to probabilistic safety and reliability
analysis of large complex systems such as nuclear reactors includ-
ing human reliability analysis, web-based data management
including reliability data and other related data, fault diagnosis,
and risk monitoring, etc. The basic PSA methods such as failure
mode and effects analysis, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis,
uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, importance analysis were
all supported in this program.
The latest version of RiskA can assess the safety much more
quickly and possess of more various functions for the purpose of
fulﬁlling different users’ requirements, and it was also developed
with a view to conducing great convenience to the construction
and transformation of complex fault tree and event tree models,
the exhibition of the analysis results and the friendliness of
human–computer interface. Furthermore, more appropriate
program architecture was designed and applied after many years’
efforts, which guarantees further function expansion and perfor-
mance improving.
In this paper, not only the overview of the architecture and
basic functions of RiskA, but also the challenges and solutions in
the development procedure of RiskA were introduced. The
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demonstrated that the calculation and analysis of RiskA is more
accurate and efﬁcient. Based on the development of this code pack-
age, many applications to safety and reliability analysis of some
research reactors and nuclear power plants were performed.
The function structure of RiskA including software architecture
design and analysis functions is introduced in Section 2. The
advanced features applied in RiskA such as fast fault tree analysis
algorithm and collaborative modeling are explained in Section 3.
The successful applications of RiskA to reactors are provided in
Section 4. Results and conclusions of this paper are drawn in
Section 5 and Section 6.2. Overall architecture and modules
RiskA supplies most of the general functions of reliability analy-
sis and probabilistic safety assessment, and many other assistant
functions are also supplied. Fig. 1 shows the modules structure of
RiskA. There are four parts in this structure: (1) the ﬁrst part is user
input, which lets users input the PSA model and some necessary
data by GUI or model transformation tool; (2) the second part is
calculation engine, in which the general calculation functions like
fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, uncertainty analysis,
sensitivity analysis, importance analysis and failure mode and
effects analysis are supplied; (3) the third part is user output,
which outputs the analysis results, user customized reports and
some other data; (4) the last part includes some necessary tools
like reliability database, some other common tools and help docu-
ments which support the main functions of this software.
2.1. Fault tree analysis
Fault tree analysis module provides popular and advanced
analysis for large scale fault tree since that it has adopted some
enhanced MCS/ZBDD algorithms (Liu et al., 2007; Liu and Wu,
2003) and well-designed data structure to make full use of
computation resources and improve computation speed and accu-
racy. This module is widely used for complex system safety and
reliability analysis, including determining Minimal Cut Sets
(MCSs), the probability of top event, the importance and sensitivity
of components.Fig. 1. Function structure of RiskA.Basic event unavailability equations are developed using the
parameter names from the Reliability Database module (see
Section 2.5). Switching Events Set (SES) (Chen et al., 2014a) and
Common Cause Failures (CCF) are two useful features for this mod-
ule. SES feature allows users to add or modify a SES to any fault tree
or sub-tree which can be very useful for users to model fault trees
ﬂexibly. CCF feature allows users to quickly add or modify common
cause groups to the fault tree, and also compute the common cause
basic event unavailability equations automatically.
All commonly used importance measures (e.g., Fussel–Vesely,
RAW, RRW, etc.) are presented and could be computed for different
levels of the model, such as basic events, components, systems and
initiating events. Importance contributions from initiator fault
trees are calculated directly as part of the basic event and compo-
nent importance measures. Sensitivity analysis of basic events and
components are also provided in this module.
In addition, a FTA-based risk monitor (Wang et al., 2009) can
manage the risk of a complex system like nuclear power plant.
As a plant speciﬁc real-time analysis tool, it can be used in instan-
taneous risk calculation, components’ importance and sensitivity
analysis, maintenance schedules evaluation and log management
to make helpful suggestion about risk-informed decision making.
2.2. Event tree analysis
Event tree analysis module (Wang et al., 2008; Yuan et al., 2008)
offers powerful event tree analysis. It’s as important as FTA tool,
and they constitute the main functions of PSA. This module enables
the analysts to construct and link large event trees for each initial
event considered. The event tree structure is developed graphi-
cally, the same as fault tree analysis module. The event tree initial
events and function events used are consistent with those
corresponding fault trees deﬁned in the fault tree analysis module,
so the frequency and unavailability of such events can be obtained
from fault tree analysis module.
An event tree transfer page structure feature enables the devel-
opment of unlimited numbers of sequences for analysis. During
individual sequence’s frequency quantiﬁcation analysis, the linked
event trees are walked, multiplying the initial event frequency and
the success and failure branch split fractions to obtain the overall
frequency of sequences.
A total of ﬁve kinds of success branch analysis are supported in
RiskA: ignoring the function events of successful branch, only qual-
itative analyzing the function events of successful branch, indepen-
dent assumed analyzing of all the function events system of
successful branch, expanding all the function events system of suc-
cessful branch using De Morgan technique and fast approximate
analyzing using the Delete Term Procedure technique. Therefore,
ETA module can fulﬁll the different demands of analysts from relia-
bility, PSA and other scientiﬁc research or application ﬁelds.
The sequence representations in RiskA consider not only failure,
null and success but also user-deﬁned states of all preceding
events making them uniquely suitable for modeling dependencies
between human failures events. The ability to quantify hundreds of
end states in a quantiﬁcation process also makes RiskA well-suited
for level 2 and level 3 analysis.
2.3. Uncertainty analysis
Uncertainty analysis (UA) module provides a series of advanced
techniques that will ensure simulation process accurate and efﬁ-
cient. Uncertainty analysis is an individual module such that it
can be used by other modules such as fault tree analysis module,
event tree analysis module and reliability database module.
Uncertainty analysis involves investigating the uncertainty in
the ﬁnal output regardless of its data source while sensitivity
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variation of the ﬁnal output. It is essential to analyze the unavail-
ability or unreliability of basic events, which is determined by its
failure mode and parameters, when calculating the uncertainty of
the top event in a fault tree. Hence, the uncertainty of parameters
has to be analyzed at ﬁrst. The most commonly used uncertainty
analysis technique nowadays is based on Monte Carlo sampling
method, because sampling method can be adapted to complex sys-
tem regardless of the system mode. Thus the sampling efﬁciency is
the main focus which needs to be paid intensive consideration.
Simple Random Sampling (SRS) is the basic Monte Carlo sam-
pling method, which needs a large number of samples due to its
low sampling efﬁciency. In contrast, Latin Hypercube Sampling
(LHS) is a kind of hierarchical Monte Carlo sampling method that
can signiﬁcantly improve the sampling efﬁciency. In speciﬁc, LHS
can enhance the convergence rate of the mean value due to its
non-collapsing property. However, it does not make any effort in
improving the space-ﬁlling property of the sampling. Therefore,
in order to overcome this shortcoming, a variety of optimized
LHS methods have been proposed and implemented, such as
Maximin LHS and Improved LHS (IHS). In the UA module of
RiskA, an enhanced IHS method by adding a correction factor to
the original IHS method has been developed and applied, and the
experiments show that the uncertainty module incorporated with
this new method is more accurate and efﬁcient.2.4. Failure mode and effect analysis
Failure mode and effect analysis module (Hu et al., 2012) sim-
pliﬁes the generation of basic events, parameters and other data,
which are the inputs of fault tree analysis.
The FMEA is an effective design tool to systematically analyze
potential component failures as well as identify the corresponding
consequences on system states. Successful development of an
FMEA includes all signiﬁcant failure modes for different elements
of the system, which means that FMEA should be performed at dif-
ferent levels including the system, subsystem and components.
While the FMEA identiﬁes all important failure modes, one of its
main beneﬁts is the early identiﬁcation of all critical and catas-
trophic system failure modes, which helps eliminating design
problem at the earliest point in the development process and mini-
mizing the design effort.
The beneﬁt of FMEA module is that it provides a structural way
of generating basic event and reliability parameters in FTA model,
which means that completing the FMEA in documentation of the
PSA program avoids duplicating information by automatically cre-
ate and update the FTA model. This can be achieved by assigning a
reliability model to the FMEA record for certain component, where
the FMEA record at least includes failure mode and failure data.
This module accesses necessary data from the reliability database
and provides basic information for the FTA module.2.5. Reliability database
Based on model storage structure, reliability database module
(Zhang et al., 2006) is designed to provide data for both standalone
and online version of RiskA by combining model management
database with reliability database.
Reliability database module is a comprehensive plant which
offers powerful management of reliability data, such as data acqui-
sition, data analysis and optimization, and data management. It is
not only the module of PSA software to provide reliability parame-
ter for PSA and risk monitor, but also it can work independently as
a web-based database management system for reliability analysis.
The primary characteristic of reliability database module includes:(1) Network-based resource sharing: It is not only to facilitate
reliability data uniﬁed management, but also to provide
reliability parameter for complex system PSA, especially
for real-time risk monitor of nuclear power plant. And it pro-
vides complete sharing of reliability data and high security
data transmission for users.
(2) Several data analysis and optimization methods utilized in
the module: Classical statistical methods (various paramet-
ric estimation and computation of conﬁdence interval),
Bayesian methods, data mining and knowledge discovery,
supplying data craft selection, etc.
(3) Automatic coding rule transformation: Allows users to cus-
tomize the encoding rules and manage intelligently coding
rules.
In addition, reliability database module provides various
technical interfaces of reliability data and parameter computation
methods. And based on well-designed architecture and modern
software engineering methodology, it is easier also to be main-
tained and updated.
At present, several international well-known general reliability
databases and speciﬁc plant databases are collected in the module,
such as component failure rate database for fusion from ITER, relia-
bility database for research reactors and nuclear power plants from
IAEA, industry and plant-speciﬁc reliability data from USA NRC, etc.
On the base of the reliability parameters provided for RiskA by
reliability database module, both qualitative and quantitative
analysis for the reliability performance of some complicated
systems could be conducted.3. Advanced features
RiskA has several advanced features. New function modules can
be easily added to the system based on its extensible framework.
This feature also makes RiskA to be a large platform of reliability
and probabilistic safety assessment. Moreover, fault tree analysis,
which is a basic and core module in PSA programs, has been imple-
mented efﬁciently in RiskA due to its possession of many advanced
algorithm. To improve the compatibility of RiskA, many model for-
mats can be imported and exported, which made the PSA model in
the commercial software can be easily transformed to adapt RiskA
platform. An interesting feature which is web-based co-modeling
let several users in different places work together, only needing
them to be online.3.1. Extensible framework
The framework structure of RiskA is shown in Fig. 2. The whole
system of RiskA is composed by three parts which are basic com-
ponent, function platform and application layer. Basic components
contain some common components, data structure, key algo-
rithms, testing codes, interface, drivers and so on; function plat-
form contains independent function modules, such as fault tree
analysis, event tree analysis, human reliability analysis, failure
mode and effect analysis, sensitivity analysis, uncertainty analysis,
reliability database, automatic modeling, model transformation
and so on; application layer contains many application cases based
on the combination of several functions from the function plat-
form, such as risk-informed decision, risk monitor, maintenance
plan optimization, design scheme optimization, risk remission
and so on.
This framework design made upgrade and extension of the sys-
tem easy thanks to the low coupling and high independence of
these parts.
Fig. 2. Framework of RiskA.
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Since the early seventies of the last century, many FTA methods
have been proposed. However, these methods did not work when
analyzing remarkably large fault trees. To solve these problems,
several techniques such as fault tree simpliﬁcation, modulariza-
tion, truncation and functional decomposition were researched,
and other methods like Petri Net based method, Binary Decision
Diagram (BDD) algorithm, Zero-suppressed Binary Decision
Diagram (ZBDD) algorithm, branch-and-deduce algorithm were
also proposed. ZBDD (Jung et al., 2004) is a good option to analyze
large fault trees due to its highly compressibility of MCSs.
However, there are still several practical cases in which fault trees
are extremely complex and the corresponding ZBDDs are too large
to be constructed.
Since the techniques which signiﬁcantly reduced the complex-
ity of the fault trees can still be improved and the ZBDD manip-
ulation can also be modiﬁed for higher efﬁciency, a fast FTA
method for efﬁcient PSA based on modiﬁed ZBDD has been pro-
posed and implemented in RiskA. In this method, a set of algo-
rithms including fault tree importing, fault tree reduction, ZBDD
variable ordering (Li et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2010) and ZBDD par-
allel manipulation (Wang et al., 2014) were developed to improve
the efﬁciency. Fig. 3 shows the relationship of these algorithms and
the process ﬂow in RiskA. The greatest contributions of this
method are: (1) a fast fault tree importing method was proposed
for the analyzer to start PSA from exist fault tree model very
quickly; (2) some new supplements were added to the traditional
fault tree simpliﬁcation rules; (3) a new variable ordering method
based on fault tree structure for ZBDD was proposed; (4) a parallel
ZBDD manipulation method was proposed for the ﬁrst time.Fig. 3. Process ﬂow of fault tree analysis in RiskA.The correctness of RiskA was veriﬁed, by using the actual NPP
fault tree models and comparing the results with ones from
RiskSpectrum (the version of its calculation engine RSAT is
3.2.3.1) supplied by Scandpower. The comparison showed that
the qualitative and quantitative analysis results of RiskA were con-
sistent with the results of RiskSpectrum. While the calculation
speed of RiskA was several times faster than RiskSpectrum (Yin
et al., 2014). As for comparing with CAFTA, the results had been
issued in public (Wu et al., 2011a) and the calculation speed of
RiskA was much faster, particularly in some cases RiskA was about
several 1000 times faster than CAFTA. In addition, using bench-
mark test cases offered by Open-PSA, comparison between RiskA
and XFTA had also be done (Wang et al., 2013) and RiskA was also
faster than XFTA while the results of them were the same.3.3. Multi model formats support
Usually, a probabilistic safety analyst needs to import an exist
model from others and perform some modiﬁcation to support
the analysis. It will be more convenient than to construct a new
one starting from the very beginning. RiskA has its own fault tree
graphics code package but also has been structured to interface
with other fault tree graphic tools via facilitating the import/export
of fault tree model documentation and MCS tables in common
kinds of document ﬁle types. It also has high quality printing and
reporting of all kinds of analysis results tables, data diagrams in
abundant formats.
Presently, RiskA support the FTP format of CAFTA, RSA format of
RiskSpectrum, XML format of Open-PSA and FSR format of RiskA
itself. CAFTA (Koren et al., 1986) is a well-established fault tree
analysis program with a well-known model format of FTP.
RiskSpectrum PSA (Berg, 1990) is currently one of the most widely
used PSA program and its model format is RSA. The Open-PSA insti-
tute is an open source group of PSA analysts which designed a
model exchange format based on XML and developed an open
source FTA engine XFTA (Rauzy, 2012).
This RiskA’s feature of supporting the multi fault tree model for-
mats (Chen et al., 2014b) not only brings great convenience to the
software veriﬁcation and comparison for PSA method and program
development, such as RiskSpectrum and XFTA, but also ensure the
possibility of cross validation of safety assessment of nuclear
power plants for safety reports with more guarantee.
Table 1
Sequences results of TQNPP.
Sequences RSAT RiskAT Time (RSAT/RiskAT)
MCS Prob. Time (ms) MCS Prob. Time (ms)
MSL1-S2 152,143 1.64E05 14,900 152,143 1.64E05 2666 5.6
FWB4-S3 139,004 1.78E05 11,454 139,004 1.78E05 2388 4.8
EFB1-S34 119,185 1.07E04 9624 119,185 1.07E04 2104 4.6
MSL1-S1 96,075 3.70E06 9476 96,075 3.70E06 1967 4.8
HHXM-S14 111,336 8.59E05 9435 111,336 8.59E05 2016 4.7
SGTR-2-S18 77,159 6.33E05 7303 77,159 6.33E05 2044 3.6
CCWL-S2 83,297 9.51E05 7170 83,297 9.51E05 1968 3.6
LOCD-S3 63,919 4.77E06 6765 63,919 4.77E06 1562 4.3
LL1-S4 33,994 2.23E06 4016 33,994 2.23E06 1540 2.6
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PSA model which is the input of PSA software can be con-
structed by fault tree linking and event tree linking approaches.
However, both the two approaches of PSA modeling make exten-
sive use of fault trees, and the difference between them is just that
fault trees used in event tree linking approach are much smaller
than those developed for fault tree linking approach because the
dependencies on supporting systems are separately modeled.
Fault tree modeling of large PSA model takes vast amount of
time and human resources even with the help of computer, espe-
cially in the present popular standalone version PSA software,
because the modeling work is conducted serially. Although some
PSA software support to import fault tree by certain format ﬁle cre-
ated by a same software or other software, there will be some addi-
tional work to process because the events or gates imported may
have same names, or loops appear after multi trees merge, or the
same structures which can be shared are not shared in the process
of independent modeling, etc. What’s more, extra ﬁle management
work is needed in exchanging certain model ﬁles.
Collaborative modeling (Xu et al., 2013) would be an effective
way to solve these problems. In the process of collaborative mod-
eling, the components of fault tree such as events, gates and
parameters, etc. can all be stored in database on the server-side
and shared by modelers who have certain privileges, so different
modelers can share everything which is needed to build one model
in different geographical locations even in different nations.
Several control mechanisms are used to manage the whole
modeling process. User privileges managing mechanism is applied
in the user management module which could assign modeling per-
missions to the users according to their roles in modeling tasks.
Each role corresponds to several privileges, for example, the mod-
eler has all the privileges needed to modify the models, the visitors
only has the privilege to view the whole model, administrator can
manage the privileges of different users on different computers
with the help of user management module. Conﬂict control mecha-
nism is developed to avoid conﬂicts between different user opera-
tions, and the conﬂict control module travels the whole model in
real time and records the state of every node. Each node has its
own state including free, locking and editing. Editing indicates
the node is being modiﬁed by other users now and operations from
other users are rejected until the state is changed to free. The prop-
erties of the locking nodes such as the parameters of events or
types of gates cannot be modiﬁed, but the nodes can be used inte-
grally in the whole model, for instance, adding the node to a gate,
deleting the node and moving the node to another position.
By applying the control mechanisms introduced above, the
effectiveness of the collaborative modeling process could be
ensured. The whole model is stored in the database on the ser-
ver-side, when the operations of different users are saved, the cli-
ent-side records and sends the modiﬁcations of model includingnodes modiﬁcation, structure modiﬁcation to the server-side in
real time. Then the whole model is updated by applying the mod-
iﬁcations to the previous model, by employing the conﬂict control
mechanism, conﬂicts between modiﬁcations sent by clients on dif-
ferent computers can be avoided. After the modiﬁcations of differ-
ent users on different computers are applied to the whole model,
the modeling task is completed.
4. Applications
As one of the most popular products of PSA software, RiskA is an
integrated platform of construction, analysis and optimization for
large scale fault tree and event tree models, and has been success-
fully applied in many complex system safety and reliability assess-
ments, such as Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant Risk Monitor
TQRM (Wang et al., 2011), reliability analysis of Experimental
Advanced Superconducting Tokamak EAST (Cao et al., 2009), safety
analysis of International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
ITER-TBM (Liu et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2007), design of FDS series
fusion reactors (Hu and Wu, 2005, 2006; Wu and FDS Team, 2006,
2008; Wu et al., 2006), Tokamak and Fusion-Driven Hybrid
System (Wu et al., 2002, 2011b; Wu and FDS Team, 2007, 2009;
Qiu et al., 2000; Huang et al., 2004) and accelerator driven nuclear
waste transmuter Accelerator Driven Subcritical – China Lead
BismuthCooledAdvanced/AcceleratorDrivenReactor (ADS-CLEAR).
Third Qinshan nuclear power plant Risk Monitor (TQRM) was
developed by FDS Team based on RiskA for Third Qinshan nuclear
power plant (TQNPP) which is the only CANDU power plant in
China and has a very complicated operational PSA model. TQRM
use the compute core of RiskA as its background. TQRM was in
operation at the end of 2010 and has been successfully operating
for three years. TQRM monitors and analyzes the real-time risk
of the plant, and displays necessary information to all the users
in the form of risk proﬁle, which can be visited by all the staff of
TQNPP. The efﬁciency and accuracy of RiskA’s compute core fully
satisﬁed the need of TQRM. The real-time and quantitative risk
information can enhance the staff’s awareness about safety. It also
can make all the departments pay more attention to the turning
points risk change and analyze the measure to prevent the increase
of risk. Operating experience of TQRM at TQNPP shows that its
functions fully meet the need for daily risk-informed conﬁguration
risk management, and thus able to provide necessary technical
support in the risk-informed integrated decision making process
in nuclear power plants. The successful application of TQRM relies
on the efﬁcient compute core of RiskA.
5. Results
The comparison tests between RiskA and RiskSpectrum
PSA(RSAT) were generally done on a computer with windows
operating system, Inter(R) Core(TM) Quad i5-3470 CPU
Y. Wu / Annals of Nuclear Energy 83 (2015) 316–321 321@2.66–3.20 GHz and 3.50–4.00 GB EMS memory. For most of the
tests, the probability truncations are set to 1.0E–12, and the order
truncations are set to 12. Table 1 listed some of the calculation
time comparison results, which have been published in Liu et al.
(2005). More comparison results can be found in references (Yin
et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2011a).
6. Conclusions
In this paper, the framework design of RiskA was systematically
introduced, in the company of the main functions, modules design,
and technical characteristic, as well as some of recent applications.
RiskA is an extensible platform which made users easily work by
convenient modeling, fast analysis and some useful tools. The
development of RiskA appears to be of great realistic and potential
value for academic research and practical operation safety man-
agement of nuclear power plants in China and abroad.
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